

# Democratic Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist Europe: The Case of Hungary

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## Introduction

It is very important to analyze civil-military relations, if we discuss democracy in the post-communist states of Europe . In particular, democratic control of armed forces was a matter of importance to Central and East European states to become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) .

Recently there were various theoretical studies of civil-military relations.<sup>1</sup> In particular, civil-military relations in post-communist states of Europe were examined from a point of view of democratic control over the military.<sup>2</sup>

As Christopher D. Jones and Natalie Mychajlyszyn state, at the theoretical level, efforts to democratize civil-military relations in former communist states expose the limitations of applying Western frameworks to transition cases . There has been extraordinary difficulty in importing Western standards of civil-military relations into media reporting, parliamentary agencies, defense ministers and other bureaucracies after communism.<sup>3</sup>

Concerning civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe, it is important to analyze problems of separation of communist party and armed forces, civilianization of the Defense Minister and integration of the General Staff (GS) into the Ministry of Defense (MoD) . In addition, the author thinks that civil society, as well as political leaders and civilian officials, has to play a role in consolidating democratic control .

The aim of this paper is to examine civil-military relations in post-communist Europe . The author focuses on democratic control and military-society relations in Hungary, as case studies .

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1 Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press , 1999); Douglas L. Bland , " A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations , " *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.26 , No.1 , Fall 1999 , pp.7-26; " Patterns in Liberal Democratic Civil-Military Relations , " *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.27 , No.4 , Summer 2001 , pp . 525-540; James Burk , " Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations , " *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.29 , No.1 , September 2001 , pp.7-29; Jeanne Kinney Giraldo , ' Defense Budgets, Democratic Civilian Control, and Effective Governance , ' in Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, eds. , *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations* (Austin: University of Texas Press , 2006) .

2 Anton A. Bebler , ' The Regionwide Perspective on Post-Communist Civil-Military Realations , ' in Anton A. Bebler, ed. , *Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States: Central and Eastern Europe in Transition* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger , 1997) , pp.65-76; Anthony Foster, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey, eds. *Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe* (New York: Palgrave 2002); Daniel N. Nelson , " Armies, Security, and Democracy in Southeastern Europe , " *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol . 28 , No.3 , March 2002 , pp.427-454; David J. Betz, *Civil-Military Relations in Russia and Eastern Europe* (London: RoutledgeCurzon , 2004) .

3 Christopher D. Jones and Natalie Mychajlyszyn , " Overview: Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe in Former Communist Societies , " *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol . 28 , No.3 , Spring 2002 , p . 376.

At first, he argues military reform after the system change of 1989 . Secondly, he argues armed forces and society in Hungary . In particular, the issues regarding the radar station in Trans-Danube area are examined .

### **Hungary's Military Reform**

There are many studies of civil-military relations in Hungary.<sup>4</sup> Issues of democratic control of armed forces were separation of party and military, establishment of unified chain of command (the Head of State-the Cabinet-the Defense Minister-the Chief of the General Staff) , and integration of the GS into the MoD .

Ferenc Kárpáti, the Defense Minister, who was a retired officer, carried out separation of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) and the Hungarian People's Army (HPA) until the early 1990 . The cabinet and parliament had no authority to control the military under the communist regime . Kárpáti shifted the authority to draw up defense policy and doctrine from the HSWP Central Committee to the MoD . In addition, according to the new rules in 1989 , conscription could be a political party member other than HSWP and a member of religious organization . The HPA became the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) in March 1990.<sup>5</sup>

Constitution of Republic of Hungary<sup>6</sup> in 1989 prescribed that the President of the Republic was the Commander in Chief of the armed forces (Article 29) . At first, the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) had an intention of securing the President post as a Commander in Chief of the HDF . In the process of the system change, Hungary had to take relations with the Soviet Union into consideration, because the future of the Soviet Bloc was not clear in summer of 1989 . At the same time, the HSP tried to maintain political influence after the first general election in 1990 .

When taxi and truck drivers protested against raising price of gasoline and blockaded the bridges of the Danube River in October 1990 , József Antall, the Prime Minister, intended to use the HDF to remove the blockade .But Árpád Göncz, the President, refused to mobilize the troop.<sup>7</sup> Göncz insisted that the President was the Commander in Chief of the HDF . He was a member of the Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD) , the largest opposition party, and became the president as a result of compromise between the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the government party and the AFD .

The Antall cabinet presented the case into the Constitution Court . In September 1991 , the

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4 Sandor Agocs , ' A Dispirited Army ' in Anton A. Bebler, ed. , *op.cit.* , pp.86-92; Zoltan D. Barany and Peter Deak , ' The Civil-Military Nexus in Postcommunist Hungary , ' in Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker, eds. , *The Military and Society in the Former Eastern Bloc* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press , 1999) , pp.31-49; Pál Dunay , ' Civil-Military Relations in Hungary: Not Big Deal , ' in Anthony Foster, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey, eds. , *op.cit.* , pp.64-87; Jeffrey Simon, *Hungary and NATO: Problem in Civil-Military Relations* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers , 2003); Szabó János, *Haderóváltás Magyarországon 1989-2001* [Change of armed forces in Hungary 1989-2001](Budapest: PolgART , 2003); Mark Yaniszewski , " Post-Communist Civil-Military Reform in Poland and Hungary , " *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.28 No.3 Spring 2002 , pp.385-402.

5 Zoltan D. Barany, *Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe , 1945-90: The Case of Hungary* (New York: St. Martin's Press , 1993) , pp . 119-122.

6 Concerning Hungarian Constitution, see [http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/hu00000\\_.html](http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/hu00000_.html)

7 Hungarian daily newspaper, Népszabadság, October 27 , 1990.

court decided that the cabinet had authority to command the HDF.<sup>8</sup>

Hungarian political leaders gave political and economic reform priority to military reform after the system change of 1989. In particular, they left unclear relations between the MoD and the GS regarding a chain of command. The officers, who were educated under the communist regime, opposed the integration of the GS into the MoD after the system change. Another serious problem was shortage of civilian experts in military affairs.<sup>9</sup>

The author tried to examine civil-military relations in post-communist Hungary by the use of Michael C. Desch's structural theory.<sup>10</sup> Civilian control in Hungary facing low external and low internal threats was 'mixed'. 'Mixed' had less possibility of military intervention in politics than 'poor' in high external and high internal threats, 'worst' in low external and high internal threats. However, civilian control in 'mixed' was less functioning than 'good' in high external and low internal threats, because a situation in low external and low internal threats brought about loose cohesion between civilian and military, within civilian leaders and within the military. Predictions of 'mixed' were inexperienced leaders, divided civilian, unclear control, divided military, unclear orientation and divergent ideas. Hungary was fit for the six cases.

The ethnic conflicts in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia urged Central and Eastern Europe to rethink security policy in the post-communist era and strengthen relations with NATO. In particular, Hungarian leaders were eager to join NATO after the Croatian Conflict in 1991.<sup>11</sup> The Yugoslav Air Force often invaded Hungarian airspace and accidentally dropped bombs on South West Hungarian city, Barcs.

Hungarian leaders after the system change were keen on dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and transformation from military alliance to organization for political consultation. In February 1990, Gyula Horn, the Foreign Minister, referred to the possibility of Hungary's join to NATO in the future.<sup>12</sup>

The Hungarian Parliament adopted the resolution, the Basic Defense Principles of Republic of Hungary, on 23 April 1993. The resolution stated, "Republic of Hungary aims at complete accession to the existing international security organizations, NATO and West European Union."<sup>13</sup> Hungarian armed forces needed transformation to meet the practical requirements of joining NATO.

The United States advocated Partnership for Peace (PfP)<sup>14</sup> in 1994 to strengthen relations

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8 Concerning the decision of the Constitution Court, 63/1992, see [http://www.mkab.hu/content/hu/kotet/1992/1992\\_025\\_314\\_I\\_tuh\\_mk.pdf](http://www.mkab.hu/content/hu/kotet/1992/1992_025_314_I_tuh_mk.pdf)

9 David J. Betz, *op.cit.*, p. 87.

10 Michael C. Desch, *op.cit.*, pp. 16-17.

11 Concerning the process of Hungary's join to NATO, see László Valki, "Hungary's Road to NATO," *The Hungarian Quarterly*, Vol. 40, 1999 Summer, pp. 3-19.

12 Pietsch Lajos, *Magyarország és a NATO: Esszé, dokumentumok, kronológia [Hungary and NATO: Essay, Documents and Chronicle]* (Budapest: Magyar Atlanti Tanács, 1998), 63-64.o.

13 Regarding the resolution in the Hungarian Parliament, see

[http://www.complex.hu/kzldat/o93h0027.htm/mun\\_2.htm](http://www.complex.hu/kzldat/o93h0027.htm/mun_2.htm)

[http://www.complex.hu/kzldat/o93h0027.htm/mun\\_3.htm](http://www.complex.hu/kzldat/o93h0027.htm/mun_3.htm)

[http://www.complex.hu/kzldat/o93h0027.htm/mun\\_4.htm](http://www.complex.hu/kzldat/o93h0027.htm/mun_4.htm)

14 See Partnership for Peace: Invitation Document issued by the Heads of State and government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council,

<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b940110a.htm>

with Central and East European states . PfP was a program of practical bilateral cooperation between individual partner countries and NATO .

It was undeniable that NATO enlargement urged Central and East European states to carry out military reform . James Burk argues that recently the domain of civil-military relations expand to encompass transnational matters . The European Union and NATO create new layers of civilian-military relations as they anticipate military cooperation and coordinated civilian control of military activities across national borders.<sup>15</sup>

Rachel A. Epstein also argues that NATO influences democratic civil-military relations and internationalization of defense policy in Poland.<sup>16</sup> The precondition to join NATO was to share democratic values . Central and East European states had to accomplish the democratic military reform.

In Hungary, the socialist-liberal Horn government (1994-1998) was reluctant to carry out the integration of the GS into the MoD . György Keleti, the Defense Minister, who was a retired colonel and former press spokesman of the MoD, could not resist the pressure of former colleagues in the ministry . The Horn government started out from the mistaken assumption that NATO accession would not occur any time soon.<sup>17</sup> However, Poland, The Czech Republic and Hungary were invited to the Madrid summit of NATO in July 1997 . Three states joined NATO in March 1999.

NATO intervened in the Kosovo Conflict and started the air attack against Yugoslavia just after the enlargement in March 1999 . The NATO air attack looked like a loyalty test of new members, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary . In particular, more than 300,000 Hungarians lived in Yugoslavia . The HDF had no capability to take part in the NATO joint operation . The Hungarian government immediately opened its airspace and Taszár base to allow NATO airplanes to carry out bombing .

In spite of joining NATO, Hungary had many tasks, training up of civilian experts in military affairs, democratic control over the HDF and NATO interoperability . Victor Orbán's conservative government completed the integration of the GS into the MoD in 2001 . However, the GS maintained independence from military administration by civilian officials as a consequence of the Chief of the General Staff, Lajos Fodor's resistance.<sup>18</sup> The Chief of the General Staff became the position of the State Secretary in charge of military command within the MoD . As Pál Dunay argues, the period of the socialist-liberal governments (1994-1998 and 2002-2008) are characterized by a process of ' re-militarization ' whereas the conservative governments (1990-1994 and 1998-2002) prove more determined to civilianize the MoD.<sup>19</sup>

15 James Burk. *op.cit.* , p.20.

16 Rachel A. Epstein , " Nato Enlargement and the Spread of Democracy: Evidence and Expectations, " *Security Studies*, Vol.14 , No.1 , January-March 2005 , pp.59-98.

17 Pál Dunay ; "The Half-hearted Transformation of the Hungarian Military, " *European Security*, Vol.14 ,No .1 , 2005 , p. 24.

18 Székely Sándor , " A Honvédelmi Minisztérium és a Honvéd Vezérkar integrációjának néhány időszzerű kérdés [Several Current Problems of Integration of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff Office] , " *Új Honvédségi Szemle* , 1999 , 8 , pp.107-109; Zoltán Szenes , ' The Implications of NATO Expansion for Civil-Military Relations in Hungary , ' in David Betz and John Löwenhardt, eds. *Army and State in Postcommunist Europe* (London: Frank Cass , 2001) , pp.84-85.

19 Pál Dunay , " The Half-hearted Transformation of the Hungarian Military, " p.21.

Douglas L. Bland states that civil control of the military is managed and maintained through the sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military officers . He argues that the relationship and arrangement of responsibilities are conditioned by a nationally evolved regime of principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converged in civil-military relations.<sup>20</sup> Hungary reformed its institutions for democratic control . However, it takes long time to form the shared responsibility among political leaders, civilian officials and military officers even after joining NATO .

Moreover, the HDF needed English language program and soldier training suited for the NATO membership, if it participated in peacekeeping operation and collective defense of NATO . The Hungarian Parliament adopted the resolution, the Direction of Long-term Transformation of the Hungarian Defense Force, on 21 June 2000.<sup>21</sup>

The modernization of the HDF needed a large investment to equip infrastructure as well as to purchase modern weapon and means of communication . The Hungarian government thought that it took long time to complete transformation until 2010 , considering a burden to national economy . The resolution aimed at transformation to small but capable and modern armed forces through shorting of military service, reduction of the troop and raising the rate of volunteer soldier .

However, budgetary restrictions played a significant role in the military reform process . The delay to modernize the HDF equipment caused NATO a matter of concern . Dunay stated that in light of Hungary's high economic growth rate - especially in 2000 when GDP grew by 5.2 per cent - many experts had questioned the appropriateness of the scheduling of the most investment heavy phase of the defense reform . In addition, concerning the radical reduction of the number of men, personnel leaving the HDF were unlikely able to compete successfully in the labor market.<sup>22</sup>

In reality, the one of the serious problems resulting from reducing the military expenditure is the deteriorating situation of military personnel . Although the living standard of officers and NCOs have declined, their jobs have become for more difficult given new expectations of learning languages and familiarizing themselves with NATO requirement.<sup>23</sup>

Péter Medgyessy's socialist-liberal coalition government was formed after the general election in April 2002 . Ferenc Juhász, the Defense Minister, made a routine courtesy call at NATO headquarter in Brussels in May . George Robertson, NATO Secretary General, blamed Juhász for neglecting Hungary's duty as a member of NATO . Robertson delivered a lecture: Fulfill your pledges to modernize and better equip your forces . Robertson said to Juhász , " You do not have any time . If you don't do this, you are in trouble. " When Hungary joined NATO in 1999 , many alliance members considered Hungary a good ally . Hungary immediately opened its airspace to allow airplanes to carry out bombing raids during the NATO air attack against

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20 Douglas L. Bland , " A United Theory of Civil-Military Relations , " pp.9-10.

21 Concerning the resolution of Hungarian National Assembly, see <http://www.complex.hu/kzldat/o00h0061.htm/o00h0061.htm>

22 Pal Dunay , ' Building Professional Competence in Hungary's Defense: Slow Motion, ' in Anthony Foster, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey, eds. , *The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces* (New York: Palgrave , 2002) , pp.70-71.

23 Zoltan D. Barany and Peter Deak, *op.cit.* , p.45.

Yugoslavia . But since then, Juhász said , “ we are treated like an unreliable partner .”<sup>24</sup>

NATO demanded Hungary to increase the defense budget after Juhász’s visit to Brussels . Hungary’s defense budget was 1.8 per cent of GDP and below the average of NATO members (2.1 per cent) .<sup>25</sup>

Hungary’s economic growth got slower after 2002 , and deficit financing has become worse . Ferenc Gyurcsány, the Prime Minister, planned to cut down the defense budget in short-term from 1.81 per cent of GDP to 1.27 per cent .<sup>26</sup> His predecessor, Medgyessy, pledged NATO to increase the defense budget to 2.0 per cent in the near future . Jaap de Hoop Schaffer, NATO Secretary General, blamed Hungary for cutting down the defense budget unilaterally .<sup>27</sup> Hungary could not carry out the obligation as a member of alliance after joining NATO, because it was difficult to get support from society under the economic constrains .

### Armed Forces and Society in Hungary

Recently civil-military relations were examined not only from civilian control of armed forces, but also from various points of view, civil-military culture gap, civil-military cooperation in state-building, the post modern military and gender integration .<sup>28</sup>

At first, the author argues studies regarding armed forces and society . Morris Janowitz thought that it was the professional socialization of the military through its relationship with and sympathy for the values of the society it serves that ensures civilian control over the military .<sup>29</sup>

Rebecca L. Schiff indicates problems of the current theory that argued the separation of civil and military institution, and explained the institutional and cultural conditions that affected relations among the military, the political elites and the society .<sup>30</sup> Schiff predicts that if the three partners agree upon the four indicators: the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method and military style, domestic military intervention is less likely to occur .

Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Foster argue that it is possible to identify five broad roles for armed forces, each of which has important implications for understanding military-society relations .<sup>31</sup>

24 *Washingtonpost.com*, November 3 , 2002 .

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A59421-2002Nov2.html>

25 *Népszabadság Online*, August 2 , 2002 .

<http://www.nepszabadsag.hu/Default.asp?DocCollID=65376&DocID=63010>

26 *Népszabadság Online* , 2004 . December 9 . <http://nol.hu/archivum/archiv-343921>

27 *Népszabadság Online*, October 22 , 2004 . <http://nol.hu/archivum/archiv-337456>

28 For example, see Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal, eds. , *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2000) ; Pertti Joenniemi, ed. , *The Changing Face of European Conscription* (Hampshire: Ashgate , 2006) ; Anthony Foster, *Armed Forces and Society in Europe* (New York: Palgrave , 2006) ; Christopher Ankersen, ed. , *Civil-Military Cooperation in Post Conflict Operations: Emerging Theory and Practice* (London: Routledge , 2008) .

29 Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: Free Press , 1977) .

30 Rebecca L. Schiff , “ Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance , ” *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.22 , No.1 , Fall 1995 , pp . 7-24 .

31 Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Foster and Andrew Cottey , ‘ Armed Forces and Society: A Framework for Analysis , ’ in Anthony Foster, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey, eds. , *Soldiers and Societies in Postcommunist Europe: Legitimacy and Change* (New York: Palgrave , 2003) , pp . 1-22 .

#### National Security

National Security concerns the military's role in defending the state from threats to its security.

#### Nation Builder

Nation Builder means that the military embodies national unity and national values symbolically .

#### Regime Defense

Regime Defense role involves the military supporting or upholding the power of a particular set of political interests . Regime Defense role usually relates to authoritarian regimes .

#### Domestic Military Assistance

Domestic Military Assistance has three subcategories: military aid to the civil community, military aid to other government departments and maintaining law and order.

#### Military Diplomacy

Military Diplomacy means the uses of the armed forces by the government as an instrument of foreign policy in the outside world.

Chris Donnelly takes notice of the transformation of defense establishments in the post-communist states of Europe . This can be broken down into three areas: democratic control, civil-military relations and defense reform . In particular, he argues that democratic control is a two-way process between armed forces and society, not just politicians dictating to soldiers.<sup>32</sup>

Ferenc Molnár regards civil society's role as important, discussing democratic civil-military relations . He states that civil society organizations can improve the effectiveness of civil control over the military and a strong ' horizontal ' dimension to civil-military relations in the form of civil society also improves the military's integration into society.<sup>33</sup> Concerning civil society organizations, he regards protest movements, think tanks and educational organizations as important.

Secondly the author tries to examine armed forces and society in Hungary historically . Hungarian armed forces under the Austro-Hungarian Empire played a role in embodying national experiences and values symbolically . They looked like Nation Builder as Cottey-Edmunds-Foster argue.<sup>34</sup> Hungarian political leaders demanded the Habsburg Monarchy to build Hungary's original army, as well as Austro-Hungarian common army after Compromise (Ausgleich) in 1867 . Consequently HDF was built to maintain public order within Hungarian territory .

Miklós Horthy was the Regent during the inter-war period . He was the former Admiral of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and executed the authority of the Hungarian King after the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy . However, the military didn't intervene in politics except the suppression of the Hungarian Soviet (Tanács) in 1919 . The military lost its reputation after the

32 Chris Donnelly, *Nations, Alliances and Security* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó , 2004) , pp.22-42.

33 Molnár Ferenc , " A demokratikus konszolidáció, a civil társadalom és a haderő felügyelete [The Consolidation of Democracy, Civil Society and Control of Armed Forces], " *Új Honvédségi Szemle* , 2003 , 7 , pp.9-22; Ferenc Molnár , ' Civil Society and Democratic Civil-Military Relations: The Case of Hungary , ' in Marina Caparini, Philipp Fluri and Ferenc Molnár, eds. , *Civil Society and the Security Sector: Concepts and Practices in New Democracies* (Münster: LIT , 2006) , p.112.

34 Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Foster and Andrew Cottey, *op.cit.* , pp.11-12.

First World War . As a consequence of the defeat, two thirds of Hungary's historical territory was lost .

Civilizing the military progressed under the communist regime . In addition, János Kádár, the First Secretary of the HSWP, who came into power after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 , excluded the officers of the HPA from the center of political power . Some soldiers participated in the battle with the Soviet army in 1956 . Lajos Czinege, the Defense Minister 1960-1984 , was not a member of the Politburo, although other defense ministers in the Soviet Bloc became a member of the Politburo .

In any case, the HPA didn't play a role as nation builder, and had bad social reputation during the communist regime . Most Hungarian regarded the HPA as a means to defend the communist regime, rather than nation and territory .

Jeffery Simon indicates restoration of military prestige, trustworthiness and accountability for the armed forces to be effective, as problems of civil-military relations in Hungary after the system change in 1989 . Because the military under the communist-regime was controlled by the Soviet High Command through the Warsaw Pact and often used as an instrument of external or internal oppression, the post-communist GS has to be apolitical and professional . In addition, society needs to perceive the military as being socially useful, militarily capable and under effective civilian control . But the relationship between the HDF and society is dysfunctional . Most politicians and society see the military as a costly luxury without social utility.<sup>35</sup>

Moreover, the military career lost its financial appeal during 1970s and 1980s . Hungarian military personnel were denied the opportunity to participate in extensive ' second economy ' . Two out of three Hungarian workers supplemented their incomes significantly from this source.<sup>36</sup>

Attitudes toward military service and toward the uniformed military were not improving in Central and Eastern Europe after the system change of 1989 . Daniel N. Nelson argues that public confidence in the military is a separate phenomenon from prestige . In Hungary, a high level of public confidence in the military does not mean equally high prestige.<sup>37</sup>

Political leaders regarded Hungary's join to NATO in 1999 as a chance to restore the military prestige by taking the responsibility for the alliance . Hungary had participated in PfP since 1994 , and developed the relationship with NATO . The HDF participated in joint maneuvers with NATO and the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>38</sup>

Schiff's concordance<sup>39</sup> among the military, the political elites and the society in post communist Hungary needs the following four indicators:

#### Composition of the Officer Corps

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35 Jeffrey Simon, *op.cit.* , pp.98-99.

36 Zoltan D. Barany, *op.cit.* , p.104.

37 Daniel N. Nelson , " Civil Armies, Civil Societies, and NATO's Enlargement , " *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.25 , No.1 , Fall 1998 , p.151.

38 Simonyi András , ' Magyarország útja a NATO-ba: brüsseli perspektíva [Hungary's Road to NATO: Brussels Perspective], ' in Dunay Pál-Gazdag Ferenc, eds. , *Az Észak-Atlanti Szerződés Szervezete: Tanulmányok és dokumentumok [North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Studies and Documents]*(Budapest, Stratégiai és Védelmi Kutatóintézet , 1997) , 287.o.

39 Rebecca L. Schiff, *op.cit.* , pp . 12-16.

democratization within HDF and the officer corps from every social class

Political Decision-Making Process

civilian leadership and accountability for the armed forces to be effective

Recruitment Method

building all-volunteer and professional armed forces

Military Style

high morale through fulfilling international mission

It was essential to perform the NATO mission in order to share values and purpose among the three partners in Hungary . However, conflicts occurred between civil society and armed forces after joining NATO .

### **Problems of the NATO Radar Station**

After joining NATO in 1999 , Hungary and NATO agreed upon the construction of the three three-dimensional radar stations, which covered Hungarian airspace and its surroundings . NATO urged the Hungarian government to construct the three-dimensional radar stations until the end of 2006 . The Hungarian government selected Békéscsaba, Bánkút and Zengő as sites proposed for the construction .

The three-dimensional radar planned to construct on Zengő could cover Trans-Danube area and the center of Hungary . Zengő is on the summit (682 meters above sea level) of the Mecsek mountainous region and is located in the Danube-Drava National Park . Civil groups and local residents around the area protested against the decision of the government and opposed the construction because the radar brought about the destruction of the natural environment .

The Hungarian government was in a dilemma between the obligation as a member of NATO and the claim to protect the environment from the local community . To construct the radar station on Zengő without a dialogue with the local community doesn't contribute anything to the restoration of military prestige . The Hungarian government organized the Committee to Examine the Possibility of the Construction of the Radar Station Ensuring the Hungarian Airspace (The Zengő-Committee) .<sup>40</sup> The Zengő-Committee consisted of nine experts in law, environment, military and NATO . The chairman of the committee was István Láng . At first, the Zengő-Committee examined whether to construct the radar station on Zengő or to look for other site .

The Civil Movement for Zengő , a civil group against constructing the radar station, sent a letter to Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, in March 2004 , and asked to stop the construction of the radar station on Zengő.<sup>41</sup> NATO constructed the three-dimensional radar stations in other member states, and showed a negative attitude to reconsider the construction plan on Zengő . In particular, De Hoop Scheffer urged the Hungarian government to start the construction without delay.<sup>42</sup>

The Zengő-Committee made investigation into function of the radar station, influence of the

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40 See news on the homepage of the Hungarian Prime Minister's Office [HPMO] , June 17 , 2004 , <http://www.meh.hu/szolgalatasok/kozlemenyek/zengo20040617.html>

41 Népszabadság Online, March 3 , 2004 , <http://www.nol.hu/cikk/149086/>

42 Népszabadság Online, March 2 , 2004 , <http://www.nol.hu/cikk/148791/>

environment, law procedure for the construction, cost as a consequence of modifying the agreement with NATO and social strain by the movement against the radar station on three site, Zengő, Harmas Hill (604 meters above sea level) and Tenkes Hill (409 meters above sea level) . The committee drew up a report of the investigation on 12 October.<sup>43</sup>

The investigations at the proposed sites were following results:

Zengő

Merit function of the radar  
low cost by fulfilling the agreement with NATO

Demerit influence of the environment  
strong movement against the construction

Harmas Hill

Merit small influence of the environment  
infrastructure to build the radar station

Demerit 22 ~ 36 billion forint cost as a consequence of modifying the agreement with NATO

Tenkes Hill

Merit smallest influence of the environment among the three sites

Demerit function of the radar  
22 ~ 36 billion forint cost as a consequence of modifying the agreement with NATO

Gyurcsány referred to the possibility of constructing the radar station on the level ground in his letter to Láng after accepting the report.<sup>44</sup> The Zengő-Committee began to investigate the possibility of the construction not on the summit, but on the level ground from a point of view of protecting the natural environment .

The Zengő-Committee drew up the second report on 8 December.<sup>45</sup> The report consisted of following four points:

- 1 Bánkút, Békéscsaba and existing radar stations on Juta (204 meters above sea level) , Kupu (206 meters above sea level) and Medina (210 meters above sea level)(without the third three dimensional radar)

Merit small influence of the environment  
Demerit function of the radar not satisfying the NATO standard

- 2 Bánkút, Békéscsaba and existing radar stations on Juta, Kupu and Medina, supplemented with mobile radars (without the third three dimensional radar)

Merit small influence of the environment  
Demerit function of the radar not satisfying the NATO standard  
cost of 37 ~ 41 billion forint as a consequence of modifying the agreement with NATO

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43 See URL on the homepage of HPMO,  
<http://www.meh.hu/tevekenyseg/hatteranyagok/20041025.html>

44 See URL on the homepage of HPMO,  
<http://www.meh.hu/tevekenyseg/tevekhirek/zengolevele20041012.html>

45 See URL on the homepage of HPMO,  
[http://misc.meh.hu/binary/6603\\_zengobizottsag\\_jelentese\\_041208.pdf](http://misc.meh.hu/binary/6603_zengobizottsag_jelentese_041208.pdf)

- 3 Construction of three-dimensional radars on Bánkút, Békéscsaba and Mórágý (296 meters above sea level)
  - Merit small influence of the environment
  - Demerit difficult to cover the interior of the country with the radar on the low ground  
cost of 22 ~ 26 billion forint as a consequence of modifying the agreement with NATO  
bad influence of the communications system around the area
- 4 Construction of three-dimensional radars on Bánkút, Békéscsaba and Liszó (247 meters above sea level)
  - Merit small influence of the environment
  - Demerit difficult to cover the interior of the country with the radar on the low ground  
impossible to control a part of airspace near the south east border  
cost of 27 ~ 31 billion forint as a consequence of modifying the agreement with NATO

The Hungarian leaders made a decision not to construct on Zengő.<sup>46</sup> They couldn't ignore the protest of the civil groups and residents around the area .

The Hungarian government made a decision to construct the third three-dimensional radar station on Tubes on 23 November 2005.<sup>47</sup> Tubes Hill is on the summit (611 meters above sea level) of the Mecsek Mountainous region . The MoD concluded that Tubes was the best site for the construction of the three-dimensional radar station, which was suitable to the NATO standard and covered Trans-Danube and the interior of the country .

However, Tubes was 4 kilometers from the city-center of Pécs . Pécs was the largest city of Baranya Prefecture . Pécs citizens organized a new civil group against the construction on Tubes, the Civil Movement for the Mecsek (CMM) , after the decision of the government on 23 November .

The movement against the NATO three-dimensional radar in Hungary is different from the movement against the radar station of Missile Defense (MD) , which the United States plans to station in the Czech Republic . The United States and the Czech Republic signed an agreement to build a radar base as part of a planned extension of the United States MD shield to Central Europe on 8 July , 2008 .<sup>48</sup>

Several thousands of Czechs protested against the agreement in Prague on 8 July.<sup>49</sup> One of issues in the Czech debate about MD was following:

Unproven missile defense technology may not provide real protection . The host country might face an increased risk of counterstrike or preventive strike the interceptors or radar, either from countries possessing ballistic missiles or from those threatened by a

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46 *Népszabadság Online*, July 20 , 2005 , <http://www.nol.hu/cikk/370680/>

47 *Népszabadság Online*, November 23 , 2005 , <http://www.nol.hu/cikk/385011/>

48 *FT. com*, July 9 , 2008 ,

<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c38cbd12-4d4f-11dd-b527-000077b07658.html>

49 See news on the homepages (in English) of Non Bases Initiative on 10 July 2008 [http://www.nezakladnam.cz/en/1162\\_several-thousands-of-czechs-protested-against-the-signature-of-treaty-on-radar](http://www.nezakladnam.cz/en/1162_several-thousands-of-czechs-protested-against-the-signature-of-treaty-on-radar)

US-led military intervention under cover of the missile defense system.<sup>50</sup>

The civil groups against MD in the Czech Republic are closely related to antiwar movement. European antiwar and nuclear disarmament groups participated in the International Conference against the Militarization of Europe in Prague on 5 May 2007, and signed the Prague Declaration against the plan of the Bush administration to install MD for the United States in the Czech Republic and Poland.<sup>51</sup>

On the other hand, the civil protests against the NATO radar station on Zengő and Tubes aim at protecting the natural environment. Most citizens don't deny constructing the NATO radar in Hungary, although CMM supports Non Bases Initiative, Czech civil group against the MD radar, and signed the Prague Declaration. It is expected that the protest activity in Trans-Danube comes to the end if the government changes a proposed site, in which the radar station doesn't bring about the destruction of the environment. Actually civil groups are not organized in other sites proposed, Békéscsaba and Bánkút.

In Hungary, pressure groups to the military were surfacing after the system change of 1989. An older group, the Alba Circle, basically supported conscientious objectors and was anti-conscription. When NGO took an interest in defense issue, they tended to do so from a particular standpoint or to focus on a single issue. Although dialogue with such organizations was not easy, the MoD made a determined effort to overcome these difficulties and continued a dialogue with such pressure groups.<sup>52</sup>

Concerning MD planned by the United States, the influence of international politics is much more serious than the NATO radar station in Hungary. Russia was offended by stationing the MD system in the Czech Republic and Poland.<sup>53</sup>

The construction of the three-dimensional radar stations in Hungary was not only to carry out the duty as a member of NATO, but also to prepare for the air defense system for its own national security. The shortage of ability for the air defense came into sight through the airspace invasion by Yugoslavia in 1991.<sup>54</sup>

The result of the referendum, on 4 March 2007, was 38,870 votes against the radar (94.3%) and 2,343 votes for the radar (5.7%).<sup>55</sup> However, the voting rate was only 32.51% and the referendum itself became invalid. To be effective referendum needs reach the validity quota of 50%.

The confrontation between the government and the local community became worse after the

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50 Radek Kohl; The Czech Republic: Searching for a Balanced Profile, in Sven Biscop and Johan Lembke, eds., *EU Enlargement and the Transatlantic Alliance: A Security Relationship in Flux* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), pp.87-88.

51 See 'Prague Declaration' on the homepage of Non Bases Initiative, <http://www.prague-declaration.org/index.php>

52 János Szabó, 'Transforming the Defense Sector in a New Democracy: Civil-Military Relations in Hungary-Facts and Tendencies,' in Jürgen Kuhlmann and Jean Callaghan, eds., *Military and Society in 21st Century Europe: A Comparative Analysis* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000), p.126.

53 *FT.com*, July 9, 2008,

<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fb9ef25c-4d4e-11dd-b527-000077b07658.html>; *FT.com*, August 21, 2008, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2e902466-6f18-11dd-a80a-0000779fd18c.html>

54 Andrew Cottey, *East-Central Europe after the Cold War: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary in Search of Security* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 111-112.

55 *Népszabadság Online*, March 5, 2007, <http://www.nol.hu/cikk/437788/>; 'Vote 03.04.2007 in Pecs,' on the homepage of CMM, <http://www.cmm.hu/?cat=szov&id=99>

referendum . The MoD permitted the construction at the first stage on 21 April.<sup>56</sup> CMM sent a letter to Jaap de Hoop Scheffer on 28 March not to construct the three-dimensional radar on Tubes in consideration of the result of the referendum.<sup>57</sup> In the answer on 30 April, Henne Schuwer, the Director of the NATO Secretary General's Private Office, said , " The selection of the location for this radar is the responsibility and prerogative of the Hungarian Authorities . As NATO does not intervene in sovereign national decision, I would therefore suggest that you address your concerns to the appropriate Hungarian Authorities. "<sup>58</sup>

CMM took the Tubes-Problem into court to protest against a violation of the law of the permission to construct.<sup>59</sup> CMM gave up a dialogue with the government and decided to settle in the court . The MoD thought that there was no alternative to Tubes . The case turned out against the plaintiff on 15 October.<sup>60</sup>

However, the High Court decided to suspend the execution of the permission planned to construct the radar station on Tubes on 3 March , 2008.<sup>61</sup> The MoD could not begin to construction for the time being .

The trial concerning the Tubes-Problem began in the Supreme Court on 9 May.<sup>62</sup> Now both the civil groups and the MoD are waiting for the judgment of the Supreme Court .

The gap between armed forces and society widened through the radar problem . Concerning the democratic control in the post-communist states of Europe, Donnelly regarded a two-way process between army and society as important, and argued that NATO could help these states to solve the problem.<sup>63</sup> However, Csilla Vencze, the spokeswoman of CMM, stated , " Unfortunately the Hungarian government always refers to NATO commitments in the debates as a kind of „final ” argument when neglecting democratic rights of the Hungarian citizens. "<sup>64</sup>

## Conclusion

Hungary tried to build democratic civil-military relations and carry out the military reform suited for the NATO standard after the system change of 1989 . It was difficult for political leaders to support from society, because of economic constrains . Hungary's reform performance generated disappointed among NATO members . Hungary contributed to NATO led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan to compensate for its slow military reform . It is important to carry out the obligation as a member of NATO in order to share values and purpose among political leaders, armed forces and civil society .

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56 *Népszabadság Online*, April 22 , 2007 , <http://www.nol.hu/cikk/443782/> Regarding the document of the permission of MoD, see URL on the homepage of CMM, <http://www.cmm.hu/?cat=story&id=199>

57 Regarding the letter to NATO, see URL on the homepage of CMM, <http://www.cmm.hu/dokumentum/HungarianRadar.pdf>

58 Regarding the letter from NATO, see URL on the homepage of CMM, <http://www.cmm.hu/dokumentum/natovalasz.pdf>

59 *Népszabadság Online*, June 26 , 2007 , <http://www.nol.hu/cikk/451641/>

60 *Népszabadság Online*, October 17 , 2007 , <http://www.nol.hu/cikk/468205/>

61 *Népszabadság Online*, March 3 , 2008 , <http://www.nol.hu/cikk/483703/>

62 *Népszabadság Online*, May 9 , 2008 , <http://www.nol.hu/cikk/491317/>

63 Chris Donnelly, *op.cit.* , p.39.

64 See the letter from CMM to NATO on 5 May, <http://www.cmm.hu/?cat=szov&id=213>

However, the difference of values between armed forces and local community came into view . At first, the Hungarian government changed the proposed site for constructing the three-dimensional radar station . But the government took a firm attitude, when Pécs citizens organized the civil groups against the decision to construct on Tubes . The MoD permitted the construction after the invalid referendum in March 2007 . The civil groups brought the Tubes-Problem to trial in order to stop the construction .

There is a possibility that the radar problem on the Mecsek Hill influences the relationship between the HDF and local community regarding military transformation in Hungarian territory . Actually a civil group tries to demolish the plan to construct the military transmission tower on Kánya Hill.<sup>65</sup> To practice horizontal control over the HDF became more difficult through the problem of the NATO radar station .

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65 *Népszabadság Online*, February 23 , 2008 , <http://nol.hu/cikk/482711/>