

# 幕末期の日本に関する2つの記述の分析

バード ポール

## An Analysis of Two Accounts of Japan During the Closing Years of the Tokugawa Shogunate

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**Abstract** Catholic interference in the affairs of state resulted in the expulsion of European settlers in Japan. What makes this event particularly remarkable is the duration of and tenacity with which the policy of isolation remained effective. Samuel Wells Williams' account of his voyage to Japan in 1837 confirms the ongoing position of the Japanese authorities. Ernest Satow, arriving in Yokohama in 1862, describes the enduring reluctance to countenance the presence of foreigners on Japanese soil despite the accomplishment of the 1853 Perry Expedition. This study reflects upon accounts of the respective authors and considers how contemporary Westerners attempted to rationalize the posture of the Japanese towards Western visitors. It further reveals how the Japanese policy of seclusion came to yield to external pressure.

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**Keywords:** Japan, isolation, expedition, shogunate

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### 1. Introduction

This paper is a brief introductory study of two 19<sup>th</sup> century historical sources that describe contemporary relations between the imperial Western powers and isolationist Japan. The first of these accounts, *Narrative of a voyage of the ship Morrison*, was written by Samuel Wells Williams sixteen years prior to the Perry Expedition and eventual opening of Japan in 1853. The second, a retrospective account by Ernest Satow, called *A Diplomat in Japan*, narrates his arrival in Yokohama's nascent trading community in 1862. The essay will attempt to interpret the perceptions and motivational aspects influencing the writers' decision to travel to Japan. It will include a discussion of why the Morrison Expedition failed, in entirety, to achieve its aims, and how the Satow was able to embed himself in Yokohama. Furthermore, the paper will begin by providing some historical context to the Tokugawa shogunate's decision to expel Westerners from the shores of Japan and discuss the limited access Europeans had to information resulting from this extensive isolationist policy.

### 2. The Beginnings of Isolation

In the year 1639, continuing for more than two centuries until 1868, Japan, at the behest of its shogun, Tokugawa Iemitsu, shuttered its markets to Western commerce and trade for the last time. The Christian missionaries had long outstayed their welcome and even those individuals who, by and large, had avoided religious intrigue, the Portuguese traders, were tainted by their association with the Catholic ecclesiastics (Hildreth). In 1639 the Portuguese were finally expelled from the Japanese archipelago only for the Dutch traders to occupy, from expedience, their former berth in Dejima, Nagasaki.

The remote port town of Nagasaki, Kyushu, on the peninsula of

the same name, remained the sole functioning trading post between Japan and the West, where only Chinese and Dutch factors were permitted, in punitive terms, to continue the South Seas trade. Some 27 years earlier, the British, having been driven bankrupt after only a decade, in no small part due to the aggressive practices of the Dutch East India Company (Hildreth), abandoned their small foothold in Hirado, northernmost Nagasaki; their chief factor, Richard Cocks, retreating unhappily to the East India Company outpost in Batavia [Jakarta], where he was fully expected to answer for the collapse of the English enterprise. Similarly, the Portuguese and Spanish had removed from Japan in full – on this occasion forcibly rather than voluntarily – because the sectarian intrigue between Jesuits and assorted mendicant Catholic orders had proved repeatedly troublesome for a shogunate that had only recently succeeded in uniting the country. As with other Portuguese and Spanish endeavors elsewhere sponsored by the Pontiff, Catholicism proved problematic for the Tokugawa shoguns, and amongst the European powers, only the Lutheran Dutch were given leave to remain, and then after betraying their fellow Christians at the siege of Hara Castle in 1638 (Hildreth). The Dutch East India Company's reward for their perfidy was confinement: a still extant island known as Dejima, no more than 120 meters in length and 75 meters in breadth, formerly housing the Portuguese factors, was vacated and prepared for their accommodation. This Lilliputian residence would form the Dutch, and indeed European, fissure in, figuratively speaking, the walls of the citadel that Japan was in the process of transforming itself into. For more than 200 years, the Dutch East India Company maintained this factory at Dejima, in which whose inmates were rarely granted the indulgence of liberation in the country at large, and even on the infrequent occasion they were, the Japanese would expect these foreign interlopers to pay tribute and meet all the

expenses incurred by their infrequent excursions (Hildreth). One such tour, initially held annually, involved a prolonged “pilgrimage” to Edo, where the Dutch chief factor, or *Oppperhoofd* as he was known, would present gifts for the shogun. Far from being a personal and intimate journey, the factor would by necessity be part of an assembled entourage of both Dutch traders and their Japanese chaperones. Together they would alternatively march, or be carried in palanquins, all the way from Nagasaki to the capital, if not with pomp, then certainly with ceremony. The Dutch, as to be expected, seized this opportunity to escape their house arrest and observe whatever they could of the country and its people, reclusive, and often hidden from foreign eyes by the chaperones. Some of these “tourists” would compile records of what had been witnessed, including documents, artefacts, and illustrations, which they would endeavor to conceal before leaving Japan for the last time. Of these hardy travelers associated with the Dutch factory, and testament to the diligence of the Japanese chaperones, relatively few are of historical note, and those who were had found employment as physicians at the Dutch factory. Amongst the most prominent visitors, there were, in chronological order: Englebert Kaempfer, Carl Thunberg, and Philipp Franz von Siebold. Of these chroniclers it was the German Kaempfer, whose short tenure in the early 1690s, who proved the most fruitful in furnishing the Europeans with detailed records of Edo Japan. For over the 150 years following Kaempfer’s departure, such was the fastidiousness by which the Japanese kept their captives isolated, his successors were barely able to contribute beyond confirming Kaempfer’s general thesis. Thunberg and Siebold, in later years and in turn, fleshed out Kaempfer’s copious notes, but, like their esteemed forerunner, found their hosts regimented and their infrequent “tours” of the country restrictive and carefully managed.

### 3. International Exchange Begins

The Japanese tether binding their Dutch guests did not begin to loosen until the Perry Expedition of 1853 and the subsequent Ansei treaties of 1858-59. These treaties, initiated by Townsend Harris, the American consular representative, and advanced by the British, Dutch, French, and Russians, resulted in the opening of five Japanese ports: Hakodate, Shimoda, Kanagawa, Yokohama, and Nagasaki, to foreign trade and commerce. As a result, the center of trading interests soon moved from the remote peninsula of Nagasaki to Kanagawa, though this was soon to be displaced by a new settlement at Yokohama, one which was better situated with regards to Edo and trade. Given the centrality of the Japanese bureaucratic structure, proximity to the capital, Edo, permitted the Western powers a greater influence over the still reluctant Japanese, having been recently roused from their centuries of

isolation.

The renunciation of Japan’s policy of seclusion precipitated a renewed interest in the archipelago, hitherto inaccessible outside Chinese, and Dutch trading missions. Unsurprisingly, the first Westerners to engage with the Tokugawa shogunate during the latter years of the *Sakoku* – or isolationist – period were diplomats and their associated entourage of seafarers, translators, and scholars. One such adventurer was Samuel Wells Williams (1812-1884), an academic, interpreter, and one time editor of *The Chinese Repository*, who in 1837, sailed aboard the missionary ship *Morrison* on an unsuccessful undertaking to initiate discourse with the Tokugawa shogunate. Sixteen years later, in 1853, Williams again sailed to Japan, this time accompanied by Bayard Taylor (1825-1878), on the (in)famous Perry Expedition. The latter expedition, under the command of Commodore Matthew Perry, resulted in the successful and, all things considered, relatively easy, opening of Edo Japan to Western commerce, and of equal importance, to foreign settlement on Japanese territory. Williams, like Kaempfer and the other physicians of the Dejima trading post, was keen to chronicle his observations of Japan and its people; indeed it is in his account, *Narrative of a Voyage of the Ship Morrison*, published in volume VI of *The Chinese Repository* in 1837 in which he considers the disposition of the Ryukyu islanders, Okinawa being the Morrison’s intermediate port of call prior to arriving in Edo:

...a thorough examination of the inhabitants, their language, and policy would probably tend to throw much light upon one of the most interesting questions in this part of the world, the character and extent of Japanese influence. (Williams)

Thus, the pre-Ansei period of Western interaction with Japan witnesses a series of largely unsuccessful fact-finding, ostensibly humanitarian, missions somewhat masking the commercial intent inspiring their interest in dialogue that might lead to the commencement of enterprise. This can be contrasted with post-Ansei pre-Meiji contact between Westerners and Japanese, during which Westerners attempted to establish a community in a Japanese culture that is reluctant, and on occasion hostile, to their new guests. One such post-Ansei writer was the British civil servant, Ernest Satow (1843-1929), who, amongst other copious writings, documented his experiences as a junior diplomat and interpreter during the years at the end of the Tokugawa *bakufu* and subsequent *Meiji Restoration*. Satow, in his book *A Diplomat in Japan*, establishes himself as diarist, chronicler, and amateur historian; a kind of Rider Haggard or Kipling-inspired non-fiction writer of empire. Satow has been demonstrated as a reliable eyewitness to Japanese history unfurling into the modern age, though, unlike Williams, he nevertheless approaches his subject

matter, – the happenings of the Yokohama foreign community – through revisionist eyes.

Following the Meiji restoration in 1868 there is an ever-increasing involvement and participation of Westerners in Japanese life. This too is reciprocated; Japanese intellectuals were sent on sabbaticals abroad to gather intelligence and awareness of contemporary medical, and military practice. One of these expatriate Japanese included writer Natsume Soseki, whose difficulty adjusting to life away from Japan has been documented (Soseki). Of the Western writers drawn to Meiji Japan, most were established, to a degree, in their home countries before arriving upon Japan's shores. One exception to this was the itinerant writer, Lafcadio Hearn (1850-1904). Hearn, a product of a multicultural union between a Greek mother and an Irish father, worked as a wandering journalist before settling in Japan from 1890. By this point in time, Japan was no longer the remote, unknown, and unknowable outpost in the western Pacific – it had been recorded by a flurry of writers from Williams onwards, eager to mine Japan for a Western audience, and not always in good faith. During the late 19th century Japan had entered the consciousness of the middle-classes in the European capitals; Gilbert and Sullivan's satirical opera *The Mikado*, opened in 1885, and *Madame Butterfly*, was first dramatized by David Belasco in 1900 and later by Puccini in 1904. Nevertheless, it was during the generation following Townsend Harris, that the formerly obscure Japan had had its cultural mine thoroughly exhausted by the sudden inrush of Westerners eager to exploit capital, whether that be commercial or aesthetic.

Travel literature, of which Williams's diary and Satow's memoirs must be regarded, has its origins stretching farther back than the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Indeed, much historical knowledge can be gleaned from such writings even if we suppose that the authors never intended to document for posterity. Concerning early Western knowledge of Japan, the records of prominent Jesuits, and that of the resourceful and seemingly ever-present convert and corsair, Fernão Mendes Pinto, instructed Portuguese and Spanish missionaries and merchants of the 16<sup>th</sup> century. In the early 17<sup>th</sup> century, the records of the British factory at Hirado, including the diary of their hapless chief factor, Richard Cocks, inform of, amongst more prosaic commercial matters, the siege of Osaka castle and subsequent death of Toyotomi Hideyori, son of Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Yodo-dono (Cocks). Following the expulsion of Catholics from Japan in 1639, scholars of Japanese history must rely on the diaries and commercial records of the factors at the Dutch trading post at Dejima as our point of reference into Japanese society. At this point it is worth noting that, in addition to restrictions upon what could be imported into Japan, there were also restrictions about the kinds of artefacts that could

be taken out: Franz von Siebold, physician at Dejima, was sanctioned for attempting to remove a map of Japan from the country (Hildreth).

#### 4. The Morrison Expedition

During the greater than 200 years of isolation, there were nevertheless several instances of Western powers attempting to renegotiate terms with the Tokugawa shogunate, initially by Russian and Portuguese ships but later by British, French, and American. One of the latter country's ships to contest the enduring isolationist policy was the *Morrison*, of which Samuel Wells Williams attended at interpreter. Williams's account of the voyage, as detailed in volume VI issues 5 and 8 of *The Chinese Repository*, proves particularly informative. To summarize: in the summer of 1837, the *Morrison* departed its berth in Macao for the Ryukyu islands (written as *Lewchew* – alphabetical spellings of Japanese names, especially that of place, had not yet been standardized), modern day Okinawa, before progressing on towards Edo and later Kagoshima. Williams, writing his concise explanation of the expedition's mission, emphasized the need for fabricating a philanthropic pretext for approaching Japan, as opposed to a military one. Therefore, the *Morrison* embarked upon its voyage deliberately unarmed, a decision both brave and foolhardy in equal measure given the prominence of corsairs in the seas south of China. In lieu of cannon, *Morrison* carried seven shipwrecked Japanese mariners, and, even more importantly, a tribute, or bribe, for the "Emperor" [shogun] (Williams). The irony, of course, is that the ship's crew was accompanied by Christian missionaries, missionaries whose notoriety 250 years earlier, had contributed no small part into the determined implementation of the policy of national isolation. Nevertheless, Williams and his comrades, having decided to both figuratively and literally "test the waters" of Japan, embarked upon their voyage, and having been resupplied in the Ryukyu islands, *Morrison* arrived in Edo Bay on the 30<sup>th</sup> of July 1837. Had there been any doubts about the reluctance of the Tokugawa shogunate to receive foreign vessels, this was quickly dispelled. Williams devotes a considerable portion of his daily diary entry to record the prevailing weather and topography of the shores of Edo, during which he quickly augurs impending difficulties:

At twelve o'clock, we first heard the distant report of guns, though it was some time before the fact could be distinctly ascertained... as soon as the weather cleared up, and we saw the [cannon] balls falling towards the ship... (Williams)

Williams's testimony is remarkable for the fact that although almost two hundred years had passed – to the year – since the last Portuguese had departed ignominiously from Japan's shores, the

shogunate was ultimately willing to defend its policy of seclusion on a shoot-first ask-questions-later basis. The *Morrison* nevertheless proceeds, cannonade notwithstanding, in anchoring successfully in Uruga. Williams states that around mid-afternoon the American ship was surrounded by small boats, at which point he seizes his first opportunity to observe mainland Japanese. The *Morrison* is boarded by a group of Japanese and is in the process of having its inventory inspected. Williams first remarks of his interlocutors' attire:

The majority were thinly clad, notwithstanding the cold rain; a piece of cloth around the loins, or a loose gown thrown over the shoulders, secured at the waist by a girdle, was their usual covering. (Williams)

Williams then proceeds to describe them in detail from top to tail, remarking upon their impecunious appearance (concerning which we may infer that these visitors were at best low-ranking officials):

A few wore quilted cotton jackets, whose tattered condition and repeated mendings indicated the poverty of the wearer...sandals were made of grass... few, however, wore them; nor were the heads of many covered. (Williams)

Having finished critiquing their style, of their physical attributes, Williams compares the Japanese mainlanders in relation to other, nearby, nations' peoples:

In the general cast of their countenances, our visitors differed considerably from the Chinese, while the points of resemblance were significant enough to indicate their connection with the great Mongolian race of northern Asia. In their oblong, sunken, and angular eyes, they were like the Chinese; but their short necks, snub noses, high cheek bones and inferior stature, approximate to the Koreans, Kuriles, and northern branches than to the sons of Han. (Williams)

Perhaps, having recently been forced to run the gauntlet of the barraging cannon "salute" of his Japanese hosts, we can pardon Williams his slightly petulant portrayal of the Japanese; nevertheless, the sentiment is palpable that if the Japanese were not impressed by the presence of foreigners, neither were the foreigners impressed by the Japanese. On this occasion, numerous visitors – more than 200 in Williams's account – subsequently disembarked in the early evening, some of whom had promised wistfully to return the following day. Williams himself interprets this response to indicate that the first encounter was nevertheless broadly successful, despite the earlier display of force.

Unfortunately, Williams's hopes for a successful encounter with the Japanese were a little premature. In the mid-afternoon on the 31st of July 1837, the Japanese engaged *Morrison* with cannons

that had been carefully emplaced during the previous night. (Williams) Despite being handled unskillfully, the Japanese successfully breached *Morrison*'s deck with one cannonball, and if this were not enough of an incentive for the American cohort to beat a hasty retreat, several gunboats gave pursuit. In the event, *Morrison* made for the open seas relatively unscathed, but without achieving any of the crew's stated objectives, including returning the seven shipwrecked Japanese to their homeland. What is revealing about Williams's notes concerning the *Morrison*'s expulsion is that the expedition party attempts to rationalize the hostility of the Japanese by comparing them, or rather the bureaucracy to that of China. Unable to communicate with anyone with enough seniority to make decisions, Williams laments the notion of restrictive "mutual responsibility" in Japan and China, which in regard the latter produces "so many baneful effects" (Williams). Evidently chastened but unsurprised by their experience, the crew of *Morrison* decide to re-attempt to approach Japan in the western part of the isles where, they justify, word of their arrival will not yet have reached.

On 9th and 10th August Williams records that a continuing fresh breeze along the Pacific coast prevented *Morrison* from dropping anchor at an intermediate destination; instead, they have made port in Kagoshima Bay conspicuously following the path of Western trailblazers Pinto and Xavier. *Morrison* received a modestly friendly welcome in Kagoshima, they were at least not initially fired upon, yet the general reception: boarding party followed by observers in boats, remained the same. Once again Williams describes the appearance of his visitors, noting this time evidence of illness rather than penury. We learn through his keen observation that smallpox is endemic to Kagoshima, and this is accompanied by liberal employment of non-Western medical procedures:

The greater part of those who visited were pitted with small-pox, some of them deeply; and our men agreed in their accounts of its extensive prevalence and sometimes great mortality. (Williams)

On acupuncture, Williams asserts that the physician's spike is wielded hardly less gently than the samurai's sword: "The needle had been thrust in between the shoulders or the lumbar region, but mostly in the belly, seven or eight times in each place..." (Williams).

While moored in Kagoshima, *Morrison* is boarded by officials – inevitably samurai – upon which he observes the attendant's swords, remarking upon how they adorn the wearer, the general condition of the blade, and the etiquette of usage. Williams distinguishing remark is upon the unchivalrous disposition of the samurai:

The Japanese, no doubt, owe much of their reputed

warlike spirit to their familiarity with arms; yet in them, this does not appear to be a noble, generous sentiment... rather a brutal, punctilious, disposition, that deadens the finer feelings of the heart, and steepens all the laws in cruelty and blood. (Williams)

Williams, evidently un-enamored with the Japanese martial class, subsequently pivots towards the mission objectives relating, favorably, the experiences of the seven Japanese mariners who have gone ashore for an audience with the officials and to plead that they may be permitted to return to their homeland permanently. The mariners returned to *Morrison* all but sure that their dispositions would be heard and forwarded to the appropriate authorities in Edo once the relevant officials arrived from Kagoshima. Not long afterwards, on the 12th of August, Williams relates somewhat different news: a small group of local Japanese approached the *Morrison*, somewhat clandestinely in fishing boats, and proceeded to communicate unexpectedly that the Americans – and accompanying Japanese mariners – were likely to be expelled from the bay. Prudence thus advised the ship's crew to prepare to depart the shores. This piece of unwelcome news originated from an unofficial source, a development that causes Williams and his colleagues some debate as to whether the report should be taken seriously. Uncertainty, never a sentiment to remain for long in the company of Japanese, was resolved speedily following the Japanese engaging shot and cannon upon *Morrison* from entrenched positions in the hillside. Williams immediately provides us with an interesting insight into anti-naval practice of the period. In preparation for repelling the foreign ship from Kagoshima Bay the Japanese prepare:

...a broad stripe of blue and white cloth was seen stretched over several rods, across the trees...looking like a fence...the stripes of cloth were for defending the soldiers, being composed of four or five pieces of heavy canvas, stretched one behind another, at short intervals. (Williams)

Their attackers then take aim and fire upon *Morrison*, Williams promptly and wisely concluding that:

...the first discharge, decided the rejection of our proposal, indicated the continued hostility of the Japanese government against foreign intercourse, and drove their poor shipwrecked countrymen into a second banishment. (Williams)

With that second, and later final, attempt at intercourse with the Japanese, *Morrison* once again set sail for Macao. Williams's concluding notes suggest that his assessment as to the actual reasons for their rough handling, despite the deliberate and considered peaceful intent, is largely suppositional. He concludes that, fundamentally, the cause of rancor is the product of a

complete distrust on behalf of the Japanese: in Kagoshima Bay, *Morrison* is, at first glance, apparently mistaken for a pirate ship; Williams reasons that the legacy of the Jesuits' banishment in 1639 continues to live within the, if not public, state body politic. Later in his summarizing passages, Williams once again muses as to the causes of their treatment, further rationalizing that the Japanese have learnt about wars involving European nations and have accordingly concluded that *Morrison* and her crew are acting in bad faith. In hindsight, this observation may seem a pertinent one, for Western powers had been engaging in opium trade with neighboring China for much of the preceding 50 years (Wallbank). However, at the time of the Morrison Expedition, the British and Chinese were yet to go to war over trade. News, if only anecdotally, from abroad would undoubtedly have been passed through the Chinese merchants servicing Japan, and consequently on to the shogunate.

Williams, himself a Sinologist amongst other professions, makes no mention of the opium trade in his journal; instead, his references to Europeans participating in wars is oblique and circumspect, and from that we must conclude that there was no singular reason the Japanese refused to accept the entreaties of *Morrison's* crew. Indeed, the only concrete reasons we are provided for Japanese intransigence are based on suppositions of piracy and the pre-existence of the centuries old Sakoku policies of the Tokugawa shogunate. Lastly, it should be acknowledged that the Dutch were almost certainly required to keep their captors in Nagasaki apprised of foreign affairs, and the awareness of disputes abroad thus justifying the ongoing prejudice towards foreign intercourse. This established policy of isolationism would have to remain until the Perry Expedition in 1853, also involving Samuel Williams. Notably, on that occasion, the fundamental difference between the two expeditions was the readiness towards the use of force: the Morrison Expedition was pacifist, civil and commercial enterprise whereas the Perry Expedition represented a United States government that was already active in the Far East, and Perry, contrasting Captain Ingersoll of *Morrison*, resolved not to take "no" for an answer. Williams writes that *Morrison* completed its unsuccessful voyage on the 29th of August 1837, having returned to Macao.

## 5. The British Return

In contrast to Samuel Williams, who writing in diary form, chronicled events and impressions largely as they occurred. Ernest Satow wrote memoirs of his Japan service retrospectively. This book, entitled *A Diplomat in Japan*, was written between 1885 and 1887. The recollection begins in the year 1861, three years post Ansei treaties and two post the Second Opium War, when Satow, then barely eighteen years of age, began his commission in the

British civil service. At that time, the British mission was yet to be fully established in Japan, so Satow and his young colleagues were instead dispatched to the relative stability of the Chinese capital of Peking to commence their studies. This education consisted of familiarizing and mastering scores of Chinese ideograms, these were believed to be an adequate substitute for kanji, the variant of Chinese characters appropriated into Japanese script (Satow). The following year, not dissuaded by the dry repetitiveness of the study of Chinese characters, Satow and one of his colleagues, a man named Robertson, embarked for the Japanese port of Yokohama. According to the treaties, the town of Kamakura was the officially designated base of the European diplomatic missions, however, as mentioned earlier, mercantile considerations, along with the construction of a new port in Yokohama – situated closer to Edo – proved the more appealing. Access to the city of Edo, at that time, was not included in the Ansei treaties (Satow); only the highest-ranking European officials were given leave to remain, and even then, at their own personal risk.

In the first chapter of *A Diplomat in Japan* Satow observes is singular, if slightly gushing intent upon secondment in Japan. Satow explicitly eschews China, however, he nevertheless remains coy about his reasons supporting his decisions. Having arrived in Yokohama, he articulates his demonstrably fond recollections of his new home and its emerging community of consular staff and merchants. Of the town itself, he remarks thus:

The foreign settlement, for greater security, was surrounded on the land side by wide canals, across which bridges were thrown, while ingress and egress were controlled by strong guards of soldiers placed there....  
(Satow)

This portrayal of the Westerner's encampment is one even Kaempfer might have felt familiar with one hundred and fifty years earlier, and is noteworthy for being superficially, and one would be hard pressed to argue coincidentally, resembling the Dutch trading post at Dejima. It is furthermore of interest that the matters to which Satow almost immediately draws to our attention are initially focused upon trade and commerce. Regarding the presence of ecclesiastics, these men predate Satow's own swift arrival. The Christian missions, never ones to miss an opportunity, had already constructed both a Catholic and a Protestant church, adding an as-yet sparsely populated foreign cemetery close to the Yokohama settlement. This, development, the return of Christianity, would, needless to say, have been considered unconscionable by the Japanese fewer than five years earlier. Regarding the character of its inhabitants, we may contrast Yokohama with the Morrison Expedition, during which Samuel Williams considers his crewmates to be upstanding individuals, at least as far as his candor allows him to mention. Satow reflects

upon Yokohama's burgeoning foreign community in rather more circumspect terms:

The foreign community of Yokohama of that day was somewhat extravagantly described.... as 'the scum of Europe'.... That they were really worse than their equals elsewhere is unlikely." (Satow)

Perhaps this equivocation is not the defense of his comrades that Satow would like to think it is. He continues to remark, negatively, that the foreign community had proceeded to make a livelihood for themselves "without being troubled with much scruple" (Satow). An observation, it should be added, in Satow's view, is that these attributes apply equally, if not more so, to the Japanese merchants.

Of the character of the Japanese themselves, in addition to the scruple-less merchants, Satow soon informs us of an inherent violent tendency amongst a certain class of Japanese. Seemingly random acts of aggression against foreigners articulate that the foreign population of Yokohama had not been embraced universally. Of the condition of the American and British delegation, Satow remarks retrospectively:

General Pruyn, [of the American delegation].... eventually driven out of the capital by a fire which destroyed his house, whether purely accidental or maliciously contrived. The English legislation in 1861 had been the object of a murderous attack.... (Satow)

This observation, or belief, of Satow's, was that the assailants of the English legislation were for the most part, but not exclusively, associated with the Mito daimyo, a fief of branch of the Tokugawa family. The consequences of these internecine disputes between rival factions were being meted out on the foreign community and Satow, together with the British legislation, became increasingly antipathetic towards the Tokugawa shogunate (Satow). Of the enforcers of Tokugawa policy, the samurai, Satow's indignation is palpable. He condemns them thus:

...when the British Legation was attacked by a band of armed men.... This was a considerable catalogue for a period of no more than two years since the opening of ports to commerce. In every case the attack was unprovoked.... (Satow)

Such a damning account of Japanese caprice remains consistent with Williams's own explanation of *Morrison* being fired upon from the shores with little, or even no, warning. The Japanese had maintained a policy of isolation for greater than two hundred years, and this seclusion was not exclusively geographic; by and large the true purpose and intent of the Japanese were also kept in isolation, their whimsy the Westerners struggled to interpret. Under such circumstances, it should be no surprise that the antipathy the Morrison Expedition faced should be repeated against the fledgling trading post in Yokohama a mere fifteen years later.

Satow's account of samurai intransigence begins to provide, acutely, some insight into the Japanese domestic political climate during the post-Ansei years, and that, at the very least, demonstrate the proverb "old habits die hard". Pithy observations aside, the manner in which these ongoing violent incidents influenced the perception of the foreign community at that time is worthy of note. That is to say, during the late *bakufu* period, the foreign community found their Japanese hosts in no small way disagreeable, and sentiment, if not outright influence, meant that they began to prefer the prospect of the shogun losing control, in preference to the restoration of the emperor in Kyoto, or even for sympathetic western Japanese daimyos (Satow).

Satow continues to relate that violence was not merely restricted to political intrigue; samurai, acting from a sense of indignation or even personal conviction, occasionally assail the foreign community. In one instance, Satow mentions a man named Hoey, who, while stationed in the relatively safe enclave of Yokohama, was nevertheless murdered in his own bed in a suspected act of revenge. Likewise, he describes another fatal attack on the British Legation, initially suspected to be committed on the orders of the shogun's ministers, which he nevertheless reasons to be a private venture, because firstly, the assailant took his own life, thereby implying that he was the sole malefactor, and secondly, the absence of an apparent strategic benefit to in attacking the commissioner of one of the prominent foreign legislations in Yokohama.

## 6. Conclusion

In the years leading up to the collapse of the Tokugawa shogunate, Japan began to attract the interest of the Western powers, amongst whom the Americans were the most determined. The initial attempts to coax the reluctant Japanese into foreign intercourse were deliberately chosen to be peaceful, conciliatory, and non-threatening. Only after the abject failure of these efforts did the Americans adopt the tactic of gunboat diplomacy to impose their will upon the Japanese. This calculated gamble by the Americans proved less violent and troublesome than it might otherwise have been, and Townsend Harris was reasonably able to induce the shogunate to favorable terms. Given this context, skirmishes between the foreign community and the Japanese authorities, some "on board" with the changing zeitgeist, others resistant to the last. Some years later, Field Marshall William Slim once observed that success is determined by the blending of resolve and flexibility, and while resolve without flexibility may achieve one's objectives, flexibility alone will not (Slim). However, to be decisively victorious, one must know when to show resolve and when to be flexible. The crew of *Morrison* succeeded in the latter; indeed, they were adaptable in the extreme, but they failed in the former. The Japanese on the other hand,

showed admirable resolve but a complete lack of flexibility. This won them victory against the appeals of Williams and Ingersoll, but against later Western missions, the absence of flexibility, the resistance to change even through the passage of time, earned Japan tactical victories yet condemned them to a strategic loss against determined Western interests.

While examining the respective authors, their motivations and drives are notably different. Williams struggles to conceal the speculative nature of the voyage to Japan. Other than to return their shipwrecked mariners and present gifts to the shogun, there are no concrete objectives that the mission hopes to obtain, and neither do they agree on a singular tactic to obtain their limited objectives, other than "asking nicely". Following Williams's account we are uncertain as to what would be achieved even had the mission succeeded in its immediate objectives. Would the Americans have rapidly established a commercial enterprise? Williams himself is content with descriptive discourse and diary writing, matters of policy are delegated elsewhere.

While it is challenging to make a direct comparison with Satow, who arrived after the signing of the Ansei treaties, one can conclude that Satow and his colleagues operated with a greater sense of purpose and zeal, not to mention self-awareness. Gone is the passivity that distinguishes the failure of the Morrison Expedition, in that stead we witness an assertive desire to shake off the perception of the Japanese that the foreign community are to be supplicants. Furthermore, the naivety of Williams can be contrasted with the transactional basis upon which most foreign and Japanese intercourse is conducted. Satow is remarkably candid in his admission that the inhabitants of the Yokohama settlement, and their Japanese counterparts, were motivated almost exclusively by monetary gain – and by any means their industriousness would allow. Exploitation was the name of the game in town, and the Japanese were in no mood to be outdone by the new arrivals.

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